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Prescribing Morality:




"Julee Lacey... went to her local CVS drugstore for a last-
minute Pill refill. She had been getting her prescription filled
there for a year, so she was astonished when the pharmacist told
her, 'I personally don't believe in birth control and therefore I'm
not going to fill your prescription.' Lacey, an elementary school
teacher, was shocked. 'The pharmacist had no idea why I was
even taking the Pill.""
Lacey's story received national media attention and represents the
bigger national debate over whether pharmacists should have the right to
refuse to fill prescriptions that are against their religious or moral beliefs.2
Karen Brauer, RPh, president of the pro-life group Pharmacists for Life
International, says pharmacists have every right to make such refusals:
"Our job is to enhance life .... We shouldn't have to dispense a
medication that we think takes lives."3  To this end, state and federal
legislatures have passed and proposed legislation specifically addressing a
pharmacist's right to make such refusals.
This paper will focus on the constitutional issues raised by such
legislation. Part II will provide a brief background of the history of
conscience clauses. Part III will discuss the importance of contraceptives
and the differences between various contraceptive methods and the drug
* I graduated from UCSB in 2002 with a BA in film studies. I expect to obtain my J.D. May
2007. I would like to thank my family and friends for their support in all my law school
endeavors.
1. Caroline Bollinger, Access Denied, http://www.prevention.com/article/0,5788,sl-1-93-
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mifespristone (also known as RU-486). Part IV will address current state
laws and proposed legislation that specifically establish a pharmacist's
right to refuse to fill prescriptions that are against his or her religious or
moral beliefs. Part V will focus on the constitutional issues raised by
pharmacist conscience clauses, specifically the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment's right to privacy. Part VI will describe proposed federal
legislation, the Access to Legal Pharmaceuticals Act ("ALPHA"), and how
it addresses a pharmacist's right to refuse.4 Finally, Part VII will conclude
with the argument that ALPHA should be passed by Congress because it
reconciles both the constitutionally guaranteed right to exercise one's
religious beliefs with the right to have access to contraceptives.
II. History of Conscience Clauses
Health provider "conscience clauses" were first enacted in response to
the United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade5 and were
specifically related to religious or moral objections to abortion.6 Currently,
forty-six states have enacted legislation that allows some health services
providers to refuse to provide or participate in abortions.7 Such conscience
clauses typically cover doctors, other direct providers of health care, and
hospitals. 8 Generally these conscience clauses provide "varying" levels of
legal protection for health providers who refuse to perform services that are
against their religious or moral beliefs.9 Some conscience clauses are
broader and "include the right to opt out of assisted reproductive
technologies, human embryonic or fetal research, and in vitro
fertilization."' 0 Other states have extremely broad conscience clauses, such
as Illinois' Health Care Right of Conscience Act, which states:
It is the public policy of the State of Illinois to respect and protect the
right of conscience of all persons who refuse to obtain, receive or
accept, or who are engaged in, the delivery of, arrangement for, or
payment of health care services and medical care whether acting
individually, corporately, or in association with other persons; and to
4. S. 809, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1652, 109th Cong. (2005).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. See Holly Teliska, Obstacles to Access: How Pharmacist Refusal Clauses Undermine
the Basic Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. &
JUST. 229, 233 (2005).
7. Bryan A. Dykes, Proposed Rights of Conscience Legislation: Expanding to Include
Pharmacists and Other Health Care Providers, 36 GA. L. REV. 565,569 (2002).
8. See Teliska, supra note 6, at 234.
9. See Dykes, supra note 7, at 567.
10. See Teliska, supra note 6, at 234.
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prohibit all forms of discrimination, disqualification, coercion,
disability or imposition of liability upon such persons or entities by
reason of their refusing to act contrary to their conscience or
conscientious convictions in refusing to obtain, receive, accept,
deliver, pay for, or arrange for the payment of health care services
and medical care.
Although the Illinois conscience clause could be viewed as implicitly
providing for a pharmacist's right to refuse to fill a prescription against his
or her "conscience," Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich issued an
emergency rule that requires pharmacies in the state to dispense FDA
approved contraceptives.1 2 In 1998, South Dakota became the first state to
explicitly state that a pharmacist has the right to refuse to dispense




The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approved the birth
control pill for use as a contraceptive in 1960.14 Five years later, in 1965,
the United States Supreme Court first recognized the constitutional right to
use contraceptives. 5 Contraceptives have become an extremely important
part of many women's lives. Of the sixty-million American women in their
childbearing years, only five percent "who do not want to become pregnant
and could become pregnant do not use contraception." 16 In 2002, 11.6
million American women were taking oral contraceptives, making them the
most popular form of birth control after the male condom. 17 Pharmacists
play a key role in dispensing the birth control monthly to these millions of
women.' 8 Thus, a woman's decision whether to use oral contraceptives
may be decided for her by a pharmacist who refuses dispense the birth
control pill to her pursuant to pharmacist clause legislation that is either
11. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/2 (2005).
12. Press Release, Illinois Governor Blagojevich's Office, Gov. Blagojevich Takes
Emergency Action to Protect Women's Access to Contraceptives (Apr. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cnfm?SubjectlD=3&RecNum=3805.
13. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006).
14. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Birth Control Guide, http://www.fda.gov/fdac/
features/1997/babytabl.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
15. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
16. Teliska, supra note 6, at 233.
17. William D. Mosher, et. al., Use of Contraception and Use of Family Planning Services
in the United States: 1982-2002, ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, Dec.
10, 2004, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad350.pdf.
18. See Teliska, supra note 6, at 233.
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written or interpreted broadly enough to grant the pharmacist the right to
refuse to fill such prescriptions.
Women with prescriptions for oral contraceptives take one pill per
day. Each pill contains the hormones estrogen and progestin, which are
similar to the hormones produced in the ovaries.' 9 The hormones contained
in the oral contraceptive prevent a woman from ovulating. That is, the
hormones prevent the ovaries from releasing their eggs.2° In the event
ovulation does occur, the hormones also act to thicken the cervical mucus,
which prevents sperm from reaching the egg and fertilizing it.2' Because
oral contraceptives affect the lining of the uterus, implantation of a
fertilized egg will be hindered. 22 It is this possibility-that an egg may be
fertilized and yet not implant in the uterus-that has lead to the moral and
religious objections to the use of oral contraceptives.23 These objections
will be addressed shortly.
B. Emergency Contraceptives
1. History and Background
In 2000, the FDA approved the drug mifepristone, also known as RU-
486, for use in the United States.24 Mifepristone blocks progesterone, the
hormone that prepares the lining of the uterus for the implantation of a
fertilized egg.25 Once progesterone is blocked, "the uterine lining softens,
breaks down and bleeding begins. 26  The lining also secretes
prostaglandin, "which causes the uterus to contract and expel the egg.,
27
To induce the equivalent of a miscarriage, a patient must ingest six-
hundred milligrams of mifepristone at the first doctor's visit.28 Two days
later the patient must take four-hundred micrograms of a second drug,
19. Planned Parenthood, Facts About Birth Control: Reversible Prescription Methods,
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/birth-control-pregnancy/birth-control/the-pill.htm [hereinafter




23. J.T. Finn, "Birth Control" Pills Cause Early Abortions, http://www.prolife.com/
BIRTHCNT.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
24. See Paige Kremser, Griswold, the FDA, and the State Legislator: The Regulation of
Mifeprex, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 443, 443 (2002).





misoprostol, which completes the process of expelling the egg.29 On the
third visit, twelve days later, the physician will determine whether the
pregnancy has been terminated. 30 The FDA approved mifepristone for "the
termination of early pregnancy, defined as 49 days or less, counting from
the beginning of the last menstrual period."' Currently, only a physician
32may dispense mifepristone. Because mifepristone has been approved and
marketed for the termination of pregnancy, it is not commonly thought of
as an emergency contraceptive. Recent studies, however, have found that it
can also be used as a postcoital contraceptive in much the same way as
"morning after pills" and as an alternative to daily birth control pills. 33
Although access to mifepristone will not be affected by legislative
protection of a pharmacist's right to refuse to fill contraceptive
prescriptions, it is worth distinguishing the drug from emergency
contraceptives because some people erroneously believe that the "morning
after pill" and mifepristone act in the same fashion.
Emergency contraceptives, commonly referred to as "morning after
pills," are used postcoitus when normal contraceptives either failed or were
not used.34 Emergency contraceptives contain either or both estrogen and
progestin.35 In 1999, the FDA approved Plan B as an emergency
contraceptive. 36 Plan B works by stopping the release of an egg from the
ovary, or if an egg has already been released, it stops the union of the
sperm and egg.37 The drug is most effective when taken within the first
seventy-two hours after unprotected sex.3 8 It is also possible that Plan B
will prevent the implantation of a fertilized egg in the uterus. 39 But, if the
drug is taken after a fertilized egg has implanted in the uterus, the drug will




32. Denise A. Copelton, Assessing the Social Impact of Mifepristone in the United States - a
Pro-Choice Perspective, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 333, 336 (2002).
33. See Kremser, supra note 24, at 446.
34. See Tania Khan & Megan Arvad McCoy, Access to Contraception, 6 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 785, 788 (2005).
35. Id.
36. See Donald W. Herbe, The Right to Refuse: A Call for Adequate Protection of a
Pharmacist's Right to Refuse Facilitation of Abortion and Emergency Contraception, 17 J.L. &
HEALTH 77, 80 (2002-03).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 79-80.
40. Id. at 79.
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drug mifepristone. It is also possible to use modified doses of regular oral
contraceptives as a form of emergency contraceptive. 4'
2. Special Issue-Are Contraceptives Abortifacients?
Moral and religious objections to oral contraceptives and emergency
contraceptives are primarily based on the belief that life begins when an
egg is fertilized. It is the official teaching of the Roman Catholic Church
"that life begins, and conception occurs, at fertilization."42 The belief that
life begins at fertilization is not limited to Catholics, but shared by many
Americans who think that any contraceptive method that prevents a
fertilized egg from implantation is wrong.43 However, the American
Medical Association and most of the medical community define
conception as the implantation of the fertilized egg in a woman's uterus
rather than mere fertilization." Thus, by the medical community's
standards, emergency contraceptives and oral contraceptives are not
abortifacient (abortion causing). But if one believes that life begins at
fertilization, and if in theory it is possible that oral contraceptives may
prevent the implantation of a fertilized egg in the uterus, it is
understandable that some pharmacists may have moral or religious
objections to providing the drugs to women.45 Although in theory it is
possible that oral contraceptives may prevent the implantation of a
fertilized egg, there is no conclusive evidence either way.46 The chances
that emergency contraceptives may prevent the implantation of a
fertilized egg in a woman's uterus are similarly uncertain.47 However,
because emergency contraceptives are taken after unprotected sex, some
people may believe that an egg has a better chance of being fertilized in
this scenario than when regular oral contraceptives are used. Objections
to the use of emergency contraceptives may also be due in part to the
common misunderstanding that they act similarly to drugs like
mifepristone.48  Regardless, under either the religious or medical
definition of conception, mifepristone would be considered an
abortifacient when taken to expel a fertilized egg from a woman's uterus.
41. Id. at 80.
42. Id. at 86.
43. Id at 87.
44. Id. at 86.
45. Planned Parenthood, supra note 19.
46. Caroline Bollinger, The Post-Fertilization Effect: Fact or Fiction?,
http://www.prevention.com/article/0,,sl- 1-93-35-4166-1,00.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
47. Planned Parenthood, supra note 19.
48. See Teliska, supra note 6, at 235.
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3. Conscience Clauses Potentially Cover Both Oral Contraception and
Emergency Contraception
Three states-Arkansas, South Dakota, and Mississippi-arguably
would protect a pharmacist who refuses to fill a prescription for either oral
or emergency contraceptives. Arkansas law provides: "Nothing in this
subchapter shall prohibit a physician, pharmacist, or any other authorized
paramedical personnel from refusing to furnish any contraceptive
procedures, supplies, or information." 4 9 While the law does not explicitly
grant pharmacists the right to refuse to dispense contraceptives, it leaves
open that possibility. Further, it is possible to interpret Arkansas' general
conscience clause to include pharmacists. 50 That law provides that "[n]o
person shall be required to perform or participate in medical procedures
which result in the termination of pregnancy," and a pharmacist is certainly
a "person" under the statute. 5 1 A pharmacist who believes that oral or
emergency contraceptives terminate a pregnancy-due to the possibility
that the contraceptive may prevent the implantation of a fertilized egg -
may find protection under this statute. South Dakota's statute provides that
"[n]o pharmacist may be required to dispense medication if there is reason
to believe that the medication would be used to: (1) [c]ause an abortion; or
(2) [d]estroy an unborn child as defined in subdivision 22-1-2(50A). '52
Subdivision 22-1-2(50A) states that an unborn child is "an individual
organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth."53
South Dakota law consequently would protect a pharmacist who believed
that either oral or emergency contraceptives destroy an unborn child (a
fertilized egg) by preventing its uterine implantation. Mississippi's Health
Care Rights of Conscience Act provides that "[a] health-care provider may
decline to comply with an individual instruction or health-care decision for
reasons of conscience.'' In addition, Mississippi law includes pharmacists
in its definition of health care providers.55 Thus, Mississippi law would
arguably protect a pharmacist from liability if the pharmacist claims that it
is against his or her conscience to fill a prescription for oral or emergency
contraceptives.
49. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4) (2006).
50. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-601(a) (2006).
51. See id.
52. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006).
53. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(50A) (2006).
54. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-215(5) (2005).
55. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(b) (2005).
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IV. State Laws
State legislatures have proposed or passed legislation specifically
addressing the rights of pharmacists to refuse to dispense emergency
contraception.56  Four states-South Dakota, Arkansas, Georgia, and
Mississippi-allow pharmacists to refuse to dispense emergency
contraception." Four more states have broad refusal clauses that may
include pharmacists-Colorado, Florida, Maine, and Tennessee.58
California law, on the other hand, provides that pharmacists have a duty to
dispense prescriptions unless their employer approves the refusal to
dispense and the woman can still obtain her prescription in a timely
manner.
59
Although only five states have actually passed laws explicitly
concerning a pharmacist's right to refuse to dispense emergency
contraception, a survey of recently proposed and introduced legislation
makes it apparent that the issue is of increasing importance to state
legislatures.60  Twenty-one state legislatures have proposed legislation
dealing specifically with pharmacist refusal clauses. 61 Legislatures have
approached the issue in several different ways. Most legislation allows
pharmacists to refuse to dispense prescriptions that violate their religious or
moral beliefs and exempts them from liability for doing so. 62  Some
proposed legislation, such as in Missouri, is similar to California's
approach and allows a pharmacist to refuse to fill a prescription only after
certain requirements are met.6 3 Other proposed legislation, such as in New
Jersey and West Virginia, completely prohibits a pharmacists from refusing
to fill prescriptions for philosophical, moral, or religious reasons.64
Legislation that specifically permits or specifically denies a pharmacist the
right to refuse filling a contraceptive prescription based on the pharmacists
religious or moral beliefs, may conflict with constitutional safeguards.
What then is the proper balance?
56. Pharmacist Conscience Clauses: Law and Legislation 2005, http://www.ncsl.org/




59. Id.; see S.B. 644, 2005 Leg., 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005).
60. National Conference, supra note 56.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.; see S. 458, 93d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005).
64. National Conference, supra note 56; see Gen. Assem. 3772, 211 th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess.
(N.J. 2005); S. 2178, 211th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2005); H.D. 2807, 79th Leg., 2005 Reg.
Sess. (W. Va. 2005).
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V. Constitutional Issues
A. Religious Beliefs Against Abortion
Pharmacist conscience clauses are designed to protect a pharmacist
who is religiously or morally opposed to filling certain prescriptions. This
note has already addressed pharmacists' religious and moral objections to
oral and emergency contraceptives. The primary objection is that these
contraceptive methods prevent a fertilized egg from implanting in a
woman's uterus. Because some pharmacists believe that life begins at
fertilization, drugs that may prevent a fertilized egg from implantation are
arguably religiously or morally objectionable. Are pharmacist conscience
clauses thus constitutionally necessary to protect the pharmacists' free
exercise of their religious beliefs? Or are they unconstitutional because
they go too far in their protection?
The First Amendment begins: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . .."65
These two clauses are referred to as the "Establishment Clause" and the
"Free Exercise Clause." The Free Exercise Clause was first incorporated
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus made
effective against the states, in Cantwell v. Connecticut.66 In addition, the
Establishment Clause was incorporated in Everson v. Board of Education.6 7
Therefore, both clauses would apply to state legislation regarding
pharmacist conscience clauses.
1. What Is Religion?
The Court has not formulated a definition of "religion" for purposes of
the First Amendment. 68 However, the Court has decided cases involving
statutory interpretations of the term "religion" that prove useful in
determining what the term "religion" encompasses under the First
Amendment.6 9 In United States v. Seeger, the Court construed a statute
that exempted individuals from military service "who by reason of their
religious training and belief are conscientiously opposed to participation in
war in any form., 70 Under the statute, "religious training and belief' was
defined as an "individual's belief in relation to a Supreme Being involving
65. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
66. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
67. 330 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1947).
68. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1144 (Aspen
Publishers 2d ed. 2002).
69. Id. at 1145-46.
70. 380 U.S. 163, 164-65 (1965).
duties superior to those arising from any human relation... ."71 Excluded
from the definition were "political, sociological, or philosophical views"
and more generally a person's "moral code., 72  Seeger dealt with an
individual who did not believe in a "Supreme Being" but a "Supreme
Reality" and still sought to be exempted from military service through the
religious exemption.73 Justice Clark's opinion for the Court stated that the
test that should be used to determine if the exemption applies is whether "a
belief that is sincere and meaningfiil occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who
clearly qualifies for the exemption., 74 The Court dealt with a similar fact
pattern in Welsh v. United States where a person sought a religious
exemption from military service but could not point to a specific religion or
belief in a "Supreme Being" to support his conscientious objection.75
Justice Black said that the critical question is "whether these beliefs play
the role of a religion and function as a religion" for the individual.76 Thus,
Seeger and Welsh define religious beliefs fairly broadly and seem to
include moral beliefs that are not necessarily based on a particular
recognized religion so long as the individual treats their moral beliefs as
religious ones. Accordingly, those pharmacists who object to
contraceptives but are not members of a religion that specifies when life
begins would still find protection under Seeger and Welsh. Under the
Seeger and Welsh tests, a pharmacist's belief that life begins at fertilization,
and that a drug that prevents the fertilization of an egg in a woman's uterus
kills a living thing, is a religious belief so long as it sincerely and
meaningful occupies a place in the person's life parallel to that filled by
religion.
The determination of whether or not a belief qualifies as a religious
belief is a difficult one to make. In United States v. Ballard, the Court
stated that it may only inquire into whether an individual's religious beliefs
are sincerely held, not whether they are true or false.77 Therefore, any
counterargument that life does not actually begin at fertilization is
irrelevant to the inquiry. The Court further stated that an individual can
claim a religious belief even if it is inconsistent with the doctrines or
71. Id. at 165.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 165-66.
75. 398 US. 333, 335-36 (1970).
76. Id. at 339.
77. 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
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practice of his or her religion.78 Thus a pharmacist who adheres to a
particular religious faith and believes that life begins at fertilization does
not have to establish that others in his religion share his or her beliefs or
that his or her particular religion teaches that life begins at fertilization. It
is, therefore, quite possible that the beliefs that life begins at conception
and that any drug that prevents implantation of a fertilized egg kills a living
thing, would be treated as religious beliefs under the First Amendment.
2. Free Exercise Clause
Assuming conscience clauses protect a pharmacist's religious beliefs,
it must be determined whether or not legislation prohibiting a pharmacist's
refusal to fill a prescription violates the Free Exercise Clause. The Free
Exercise Clause is invoked: "when the government prohibits behavior that
a person's religion requires;" "when the government requires conduct that a
person's religion prohibits;" and when an individual claims that a law
makes religious observance more difficult. 79 Proposed state legislation that
completely prohibits a pharmacist from refusing to fill a prescription on
religious grounds may trigger the Free Exercise Clause because it requires
behavior-the filling of the prescription-that a person's religion prohibits,
because the prescription may kill the fertilized egg.
The Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause has undergone
some changes in recent years.8° In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court held that
strict scrutiny should be used when evaluating laws that burden the free
exercise of religion. 8' The Court continued to apply strict scrutiny to free
exercise claims until its 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith.82
In Smith, the Court held the Free Exercise Clause inapplicable to neutral
laws of general applicability. This means that "no matter how much a law
burdens religious practices, it is constitutional... so long as it does not
single out religious behavior for punishment and was not motivated by a
desire to interfere with religion." 83 In Smith, the Court determined that a
law prohibiting the use of peyote did not violate the Constitution, despite
the fact that some Native Americans religiously required its use, because
the law applied to everyone in the state and did not punish peyote
consumption specifically because its use was religiously motivated.
84
78. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981).
79. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 68, at 1200.
80. Id. at 1201.
81. 374 U.S. 398,406 (1963).
82. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
83. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 1201.
84. 494 U.S. at 882.
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However, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, the Court
held that a city ordinance was unconstitutional because its prohibition on
the ritual sacrifice of animals was directed at a particular religious sect.85
Under these cases, "a neutral law of general applicability only has to meet
rational basis review, but laws that are directed at religious practices have
to meet strict scrutiny., 86 Congress attempted to reverse the effects of
Smith by requiring courts to apply strict scrutiny to free exercise claims by
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") of 1993.87 The
Court responded in City of Boerne v. Flores by declaring the RFRA
unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of Congress' powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 88  The result is that strict scrutiny applies to
federal legislation under the RFRA, while Smith continues to apply to the
states.
Legislators should consider whether proposed legislation that denies a
pharmacist the right to refuse to fill prescriptions that are against his or her
religious beliefs is a constitutional violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
Such legislation would not be generally applicable under Smith because it
would specifically target pharmacists who have religious or moral
objection to the use contraceptive methods. Additionally, such legislation
would most likely not be neutral. In Hialeah, the Court stated that a city
ordinance that prohibited the ritual sacrifice of animals was not neutral
because its clear object was to prohibit the religious practice of the
Santerias. 89 Can the refusal to fill a prescription be properly characterized
as a religious practice under the Free Exercise Clause? An argument can
certainly be made that refraining from the use of contraceptive methods
that one believes may potentially kill a fertilized egg is part of a religious
practice and that refraining from assisting others in their contraceptive use
is equally a part of that religious practice. If a challenged law is neither
neutral nor generally applicable, the Court will apply strict scrutiny.90
When applying strict scrutiny, a law can only survive if it is justified
by a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.91 Most likely, a state would argue that it has an interest in
ensuring its citizens have unburdened access to contraceptives. Moreover,
because there is a constitutional right to contraceptives, a strong argument
85. 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993).
86. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 1202.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
88. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
89. 508 U.S. at 534.
90. Id. at 531-32.
91. See CHEMERNSKY, supra note 68, at 520.
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can be made that such an interest is compelling. The next question is
whether legislation that prohibits a pharmacist from refusing to fill
prescriptions against his religious or moral beliefs is narrowly tailored to
the state government's interest in ensuring a woman has access to
contraceptives. Such legislation is most likely not narrowly tailored. A
state could presumably and adequately accomplish its goals in ways that do
not target pharmacists who have religious or moral objections to the use of
contraceptives. For example, a state could pass legislation that
accommodates a pharmacist's religious objections while placing the burden
of ensuring that a woman has access to contraceptives on the pharmacy
itself.
3. Establishment Clause
Legislation that allows a pharmacist to refuse to fill a prescription for
contraceptives based on the pharmacist's religious beliefs may also violate
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has
laid out three different modes of analysis with respect to the Establishment
Clause. 92  First, "strict separation," which urges that government and
religion should be separated to the greatest extent possible.93 Second,
government must be neutral toward religion. 94 Several Supreme Court
Justices have used a "symbolic endorsement" test to evaluate whether the
government's actions are neutral, which holds that "the government
violates the Establishment Clause if it symbolically endorses a particular
religion or if it generally endorses either religion or secularism." 95 Third,
the accommodation approach,96 which suggests that government should be
accommodating to religion.97 Under the accommodation approach, the
government only violates the Establishment Clause if it "literally
establishes a church, coerces religious participation, or favors one religion
over others. 98
Despite these varying modes of analysis, certain principles regarding
the establishment clause are settled. For example, when the government
favors one religious group over another, such discrimination will be subject
to strict scrutiny.99 On the other hand, for non-discriminatory laws, the
92. Id. at 1149.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1151.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1153.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id at 1156.
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Court applies the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.'00 The
Lemon test is often formulated as: "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster
'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' The Lemon test
is used by Justices taking the separationist approach and by Justices who
favor the neutrality approach (although they add that the legislative purpose
or effect is to symbolically endorse religion). 10 2 Justices who advocate the
accommodation approach recommend ending the use of the Lemon test.
10 3
Although the Lemon test has not been officially discarded, current Justices
have advocated the use of an alternative analysis, such as whether the
government's action "symbolically endorses religion."' In, McCreary
County v. ACLU of Kentucky, the Court used both the Lemon test and the
neutrality approach to determine that a display of the Ten Commandments
did not have a secular purpose and therefore violated the Establishment
Clause. 10 5 In McCreary, the Court said: "When the government acts with
the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates
that central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there
being no neutrality when the government's ostensible object is to take
sides."'1 6 The Court went on to state: "Given the variety of interpretative
problems, the principle of neutrality has provided a good sense of direction:
the government may not favor one religion over another, or religion over
irreligion, religious choice being the prerogative of individuals under the
Free Exercise Clause."'
10 7
The three prongs of the Lemon test would presumably be applied to
determine if pharmacist conscience clause legislation violated the
Establishment Clause. The first prong is whether there is a secular purpose
for the law. A strong argument could be made that the sole purpose of a
pharmacist conscience clause is to allow pharmacists to practice their
religious beliefs by refraining from assisting others in using contraceptive
methods. As such, the legislation would have a religious, not secular,
purpose. The government could respond that its purpose was to guarantee
100. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
101. Id. (citation omitted).
102. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 1159.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 125 S.Ct. 2722 (2005).
106. Id. at 2733 (citing Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)).
107. Id. at 2742.
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that pharmacists would not be punished for exercising their religion, a right
that is protected by the Constitution. This argument, however, is rather
weak because, in protecting the constitutional right to free exercise of
religion, such legislation ignores another important constitutional right, the
right to obtain and use contraceptives. Without including alternative ways
for a woman to fill her prescription once a pharmacist has refused her, the
state is favoring one constitutional right over another. This favoritism
makes doubtful the argument that the state enacted a pharmacist conscience
clause with the secular purpose of merely protecting an individual's
constitutional rights.
In Edwards v. Aguillard, the Court ruled unconstitutional a state law
that required public schools to teach creationism if evolution was also
taught. 10 8 The Aguillard Court stated that "because the primary purpose of
the Creationism Act is to endorse a particular religious doctrine, the Act
furthers religion in violation of the First Amendment." 10 9 Applying this
reasoning to conscience clause legislation, it could be argued that the
primary purpose of conscience clause legislation is the state's endorsement
of the religious doctrine that life begins at fertilization in violation of the
establishment clause. As discussed above, in contrast to the religious belief
that life begins at fertilization, the medical community believes that
conception does not occur until a fertilized egg is implanted in a woman's
uterus. 110
The second prong of the Lemon test requires that the principal effect
of a law must not advance nor inhibit religion. 1' The Court used the
second prong of the Lemon test to invalidate a Connecticut law that created
an absolute right for individuals to not work for religious reasons because
"the statute goes beyond having an incidental or remote effect of advancing
religion. The statute has a primary effect that impermissibly advances a
particular religious practice."11 2 However, the primary effect of conscience
clause legislation is not to advance a particular religious practice. Instead,
the primary effect appears to be accommodation of religious belief.
Unfortunately, this accommodation also has the potential effect of making
it more difficult for some women to have their contraceptive prescriptions
filled. Alternatively, if the neutrality approach is taken, the Court phrases
the question as whether the law is a symbolic endorsement of a religious
108. 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987).
109. Id. at 593.
110. See Herbe, supra note 36, at 45.
111. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
112. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (citations omitted).
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practice.' 13 Under this approach, it seems more likely that conscience
clause legislation would be found to be a symbolic endorsement of a
religious practice.
The third prong of the Lemon test forbids excessive government
entanglement with religion." 4 The Court has held that an entanglement
occurs when a law requires "comprehensive, discriminating, and
continuing state surveillance" of religion. 15 It is possible that the third
prong does not have much relevance with regards to conscience clause
legislation; a state government may pass legislation including a pharmacist
conscience clause and not participate any further. One the other hand, it is
possible that the state would have to enforce the law if it is not being
obeyed, or defend the law from claims of unconstitutionality.
In sum, it is possible that legislation protecting a pharmacist's right to
refuse to prescribe contraceptives violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. Accordingly, legislators should be wary of passing
potentially unconstitutional legislation.
B. Right to Privacy
Pharmacist conscience clause legislation creates a conflict between the
constitutionally protected right to the free exercise of religious beliefs and
the constitutionally protected right to contraceptives. Griswold v.
Connecticut established that a married couple's decision to have children
was constitutionally protected by the penumbras of several constitutional
amendments. 116 In Griswold, the defendants were charged with giving
information regarding contraceptives and prescribing contraceptives to a
married couple in violation of a Connecticut statute. 17 The Court held that
the constitutional right to privacy extends to the use of contraceptives for
married persons. 18 The Court said: "We deal with a right to privacy older
than the Bill of Rights... marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to a degree of being sacred."
'"l 9
Additionally, the Court was concerned that the Connecticut statute invaded
113. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 1161.
114. 403 U.S. at 612.
115. Id. at 619.
116. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). More specifically, the Court found this constitutional
protection in a right to privacy embodied in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Id.
at 484.





the privacy of the marital bedroom, an idea "repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."'
120
The constitutional right to contraceptives was extended to single
individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird.12 1 In Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court
declared that a Massachusetts law that prohibited the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons was unconstitutional. 122 The Court
agreed that Griswold only determined that the right of privacy regarding
contraceptives "inhered in the marital relationship."'' 23 However, the Court
went on to state that "the marital couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and a heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with
a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.' 24 The Court concluded: "If
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child."'125 Thus, the Court recognized that the right to contraceptives is a
fundamental right. Another important aspect of Eisenstadt is the
determination that prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives served no
legitimate governmental purpose.' 26 In addition, the Court stated that laws
limiting access to contraceptives could not be defended as health
measures.
27
In Carey v. Population Services, International, the Court established
that strict scrutiny applies to a law that restricts access to contraceptives.1
28
The Court determined that any regulation that limits the right to
contraception may only be justified by a narrowly drawn compelling state
interest. 129  In Carey, the Court invalidated a New York law that
criminalized three activities: (1) the sale or distribution of contraceptives to
minors; (2) the distribution of contraceptives (even nonprescription ones) to
persons over age fifteen by anyone other than a licensed pharmacist; and
(3) advertising or displaying contraceptives. 130 Where the "fundamental"
120. Id.
121. 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 453.
124. Id.
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 448 ("It would be plainly unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts has
prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as punishment for fornication.").
127. Id. at 450.
128. 431 U.S. 678, 696-97 (1977).
129. Id. at 688.
130. Id. at 682.
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decision whether to beget children is involved, regulations that impose a
burden on that decision, "may be justified only by compelling state
interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express those interests."'
' 31
Turning specifically to the requirement that a licensed pharmacist dispense
contraceptives to those over the age of fifteen, the Court said that even
though such a requirement is not as great of a burden as a total ban, "the
restriction of distribution to a small fraction of the total number of possible
retail outlets renders contraceptive devices considerably less accessible to
the public. 132
The state laws that have been proposed and passed which permit a
pharmacist to refuse to prescribe contraceptives without providing any
other alternatives or detailing the situations in which pharmacists may
refuse are most likely unconstitutional under Carey.133 It is not much of a
leap to suppose that in certain pharmacies, in certain areas of this country,
allowing pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions would act as an actual
impairment to one's constitutional right to access contraceptives. In such
circumstances, the state would be obligated to show that its laws regarding
pharmacists' right to refuse was "narrowly drawn" to satisfy a legitimate
state interest. Under Eisenstadt, health measures and the state's desire to
prohibit fornication cannot constitute a compelling interest. 34 However,
states could argue that it is an important state interest to allow its residents
the right to adhere to their religious beliefs.
The real question then is whether state legislation that does not
address the circumstances in which such a refusal is appropriate and does
not provide any alternatives for persons with valid prescriptions is
"narrowly drawn." I argue that they are not. Without limiting the effects
of a pharmacist's refusal to prescribe contraceptives, it is quite possible that
contraceptives will be unavailable in a number of markets-either because
the pharmacy does not employ pharmacists who will fill such prescriptions
or because the pharmacy's policy is to not carry such contraceptives. What
good is a fundamental right to contraceptives if there is nowhere to obtain
them and no one to obtain them from? The California law and the
proposed federal law, ALPHA, 135 fair much better constitutionally. Both
laws allow a pharmacist to object based on their constitutionally protected
freedom of religion and belief-a valid state interest-and are narrowly
131. Id. at 686 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 689.
133. Seeid.
134. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448-50 (1972).
135. S. 809, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1652, 109th Cong. (2005).
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drawn so as not to substantially interfere with the constitutionally protected
right to contraceptives.' 
36
However, the inquiry does not end there. The constitutional
determination is based in large part on whether one applies the Court's
contraceptive analysis or abortion analysis. Roe v. Wade provides that
there is a fundamental right to an abortion in the first trimester. 137 Roe also
locates this right in the Fourteenth Amendment.1 38 If the use of emergency
contraceptives is determined to be more like abortion than regular
contraceptives, Roe and its progeny would be used to determine whether
the state law is unconstitutional. In the Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement on abortion, Stenberg v. Carhart, a state law designed to
further the state's interest in fetal life imposed an undue burden on the
woman's decision before viability and was unconstitutional. 3 9  The
analysis under Carhart becomes tricky with respect to pharmacist
conscience clauses; can the state argue that the clauses have dual
objectives, protecting the rights of pharmacists and protecting fetal life?
And if so, is it then harder to show that such clauses are a "substantial
burden?" Under this analysis, an individual challenging a pharmacist
conscience clause might find it difficult to show that such a law
substantially burdened her access to contraceptives.140  Regardless, it is
likely that state legislation that allows pharmacists to refuse to fill valid
prescriptions for contraceptives is unconstitutional. How the Court would
deal with certain aspects of the law is open to debate. It should be noted
however, that the Court is unlikely to apply its abortion jurisprudence
based on the theory that either oral contraceptives or emergency
contraceptives are abortion because they may decrease the likelihood of the
implantation of a fertilized egg in the uterus. This is because in Roe the
Court stated: "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life
begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine,
philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive a any consensus, the
judiciary ... is not in any position to speculate as to the answer."'
' 41
136. See id; S.B. 644, 2005 Leg., 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005).
137. 410 U.S. 113, 113, 155 (1973).
138. Id. at 153.
139. 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000).
140. For example, how many different pharmacists and pharmacies must refuse to fill her
prescription before a court will determine that there was a burden to her getting access to the
contraceptive?
141. 410 U.S. at 159.
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VI. Federal Legislation-Access to Legal Pharmaceuticals Act
ALPHA was introduced into both the House and Senate on April 14,
2005.142 Both versions of the bill are currently in committee. 14 ALPHA,
like California law, takes a middle ground approach to pharmacist
conscious clauses. Rather than completely permit or deny the right of
pharmacists to refuse to fulfill prescriptions that are against their religious
or moral beliefs, ALPHA focuses on those circumstances when such a
refusal would be permissible.
The Findings sections of ALPHA suggests an awareness of the
constitutional issue at stake by finding both that "an individual's right to
religious belief and worship is a protected, fundamental right" and that "an
individual's right to access legal contraception is a protected fundamental
right.' ' 144 The legislators are aware of the potential conflict between these
two fundamental rights: "An individual's right to religious belief and
worship cannot impede an individual's access to legal prescriptions,
including contraception."' 145  It is with an awareness of competing
constitutional interests that ALPHA attempts to address the debate and
establish national uniformity regarding this particularly thorny debate.
The goal of ALPHA is to explicitly "establish certain duties for
pharmacies when pharmacists employed by the pharmacy refuse to fill
valid prescriptions ... on the basis of personal beliefs."'146 The legislation
allows a pharmacist to refuse to fill a prescription, thereby safeguarding
against any First Amendment restrictions, while at the same time
establishing that it is the pharmacy's duty to ensure that valid prescriptions
will be filled despite a particular pharmacist's refusal. This second
objective is fulfilled in three ways. First, when a product is in stock and a
pharmacist refuses to fill a valid prescription, the pharmacy must ensure
that another pharmacist employed at the pharmacy will fill the
prescription. 147 Second, if the product is not in stock and a pharmacist
refuses to order the product, it must be ordered by another pharmacist.
148
Third, the pharmacy may not employ any pharmacist who engages in any
conduct intended to "prevent or deter an individual from filling a valid
prescription for a product or from ordering the product.'
149
142. S. 809, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1652, 109th Cong. (2005).
143. S. 809, 109th Cong. (2005).
144. Id. at § 2(2).
145. Id. at § 2(1).
146. Id. at Preamble.
147. Id. § 249(a)(1).
148. Id. § 249(a)(2).
149. Id. § 249(a)(3).
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The bill contains an enforcement mechanism as well. 150 A pharmacy
that violates the requirements of subsection (a) is liable for a civil penalty
of $5,000 per day but not exceeding $500,000 for the same proceeding.
1 51
Additionally a person harmed by a violation of subsection (a) may sue the
pharmacy and be awarded appropriate relief, including if necessary,
punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs.
152
ALPHA allows pharmacists the right to refuse to fill prescriptions
because of their religious or moral beliefs, which are protected under the
First Amendment. At the same time, ALPHA places the burden on the
pharmacy to ensure that persons with valid prescriptions get their
constitutionally protected access to contraceptives. ALPHA attempts to
ensure that neither constitutional right is violated when a pharmacist is
faced with the possibility of filling a prescription, the nature of which he or
she believes is morally wrong. However, certain issues still remain: What
happens if a pharmacy is unable to find enough pharmacists to guarantee
that there will be at least one pharmacist who will fill the prescriptions; is it
fair to impose such a burden on a pharmacy; and what about a pharmacy's
right to determine its policy?
VII. Conclusion
Legislation that provides pharmacists an absolute right to refuse to fill
valid prescriptions based on the pharmacist's religious or moral beliefs
threatens an individual's constitutionally protected right to contraceptives.
Likewise, legislation that prohibits a pharmacist from refraining from
filling prescriptions he or she finds religiously or morally objectionable
may go too far in denying the constitutional right to the free exercise of
religious belief as guaranteed by the First Amendment. Though not a
perfect solution, the ALPHA legislation reconciles both the free exercise of
religious belief and the right to privacy provisions of the U.S. Constitution
by allowing pharmacists to refrain from filling prescriptions against their
conscience so long as a woman impacted by this refusal can still obtain her
prescription. Even if ALPHA does not pass, state and federal legislatures
should still keep these constitutional issues in mind when considering
legislation regarding pharmacist conscience clauses and should attempt a
similar reconciliation for these potentially conflicting constitutional
interests.
150. Id. § 249(c).
151. Id. § 249(c)(1).
152. Id. § 249(c)(2).
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